

VZCZCXRO7831
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0206/01 0751544
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161544Z MAR 07
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7157
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1096
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000206

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, DRL, INL, AND S/WCI, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN
FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER, OPDAT FOR
ACKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [KJUS](#) [KCRM](#) [EAID](#) [KDEM](#) [UNMIK](#) [YI](#)

SUBJECT: KOSOVO: NEW POLICE COMMISSIONER INTENDS TO
MAINTAIN UNMIK STRENGTH THROUGHOUT TRANSITION

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

11. (C) SUMMARY: New UNMIK Police Commissioner Richard Monk told COM March 14 that he will work to maintain UNMIK Civpol's strength throughout the transition period to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) rule of law mission. The same day, EU Planning Team Head Casper Klynge said the EU intends to bring in additional police officers midway through the transition -- and not pull from existing UNMIK Civpol assets until status day -- to help UNMIK maintain its strength while the ESDP mission builds up. The COM shared our concerns regarding a range of police issues with Monk, from the Civpol strength issue to the weak Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA), as well as the political pressure Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers, especially in the Serb-majority north, are likely to face from their headline leadership during this sensitive period. Monk (protect) acknowledged those concerns, noting that he would focus on building KPS capacity and asking for assistance to ensure that key, high-level international officers with experience and knowledge are not lost over the remaining months of UNMIK's tenure due to contributing nations' refusal to extend their contracts. END SUMMARY.

UNMIK will try to maintain Civpol strength; ESDP will not draw before status

12. (C) Newly appointed UNMIK Police Commissioner Richard Monk told COM on March 14 that he will work to maintain UNMIK Civpol's strength throughout the transition period to the inception of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) rule of law mission. Also on March 14, EU Planning Team (EUP) Head Casper Klynge informed COM that the ESDP mission will bring in 500 additional personnel, 50 to 60 percent of whom will be police, midway through the four-month transition period. (It is still unclear what exactly these 250-300 new ESDP police officers would do, however. Klynge adviser Alessio Zuccarini told poloff they would not have executive functions and might include one or two Crowd and Riot Control (CRC) units. The EUP will not make that determination until receiving member states' reactions to the job descriptions the planning team circulated last week.) The EUP intends to

have EU and U.S. police officers currently serving in the UNMIK mission change hats on the last day of the transition period, thereby avoiding any possible ESDP mission drain on UNMIK Civpol personnel.

Monk Raises Concerns about Loss of Experienced Civpol Officers

¶3. (C) Monk expressed concern that UNMIK might lose key high-level officers due to contributing nations' refusal to extend their contracts, specifically mentioning two German officers who were about to depart. However, he was not specific on what further losses he feared, nor did he imply that UNMIK police levels overall were in jeopardy. (Note: We are following up to get a better picture of which high-level UNMIK police may be departing in the coming months, and to ensure that the U.S. contingent and its executive-level officers remain at existing levels in Kosovo throughout the transition period.) Monk noted what he considered to be deficiencies in KPS capabilities and said he would attempt to focus on strategic capacity-building during the rest of UNMIK's tenure, asking for USOP/ICITAP advice on critical areas for development. Monk also acknowledged that political issues would rise to the forefront over the coming months; he and COM discussed the pressure that might be brought to bear on Serb KPS officers in the north and elsewhere by the hardline Serb leadership once the Ahtisaari recommendation for Kosovo status became public record.

¶4. (C) COMMENT: Monk seemed keenly aware of the challenges ahead, both in making certain KPS has the necessary capacity and ensuring that international civpol has the continuing strength to deal with contingencies. The fact that the EU will avoid drawing from current UNMIK police assets before the transition should help with the latter, but we will need

PRISTINA 00000206 002 OF 002

to know more about what the initial buildup of ESDP officers in the transition phase is designed to accomplish. We will report further on that issue, as well as the UNMIK personnel retention issue, as we learn more. END COMMENT.

¶5. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina does not clear this cable for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
KAIDANOW